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ARTICLES
Behavioral and Other Human Ecologies: Critique, Response and
Progress through Criticism
BRUCE WINTERHALDER1
Abstract
This paper has three goals: (1) to define the anthropological subfield of human behavioral ecology (HBE) and
characterize recent progress in this research tradition; (2) to address Joseph’s (2000) critique of HBE from the
perspective of an advocate of that field; and (3) to suggest features that make for effective criticism of research
traditions. (1) HBE attempts to understand intra- and inter-societal diversity in human behavior as the
product of species-wide adaptive goals which must be realized in highly diverse, socio-environmental circum-
stances. Theoretically, HBE draws selectively from neo-Darwinism and its cultural-evolutionary analogs, from
micro-economics, and from elements of formal decision and game theory. Applications generally use simple,
formal models as heuristic devices for generating testable hypotheses about resource use, reproductive and social
behavior, and life history traits. (2) Using Kuhn’s (1977) and McMullin’s (1983) criteria for assessing progress
in a research tradition, I examine Joseph’s review of HBE, indicating the several points on which we agree and
the greater number for which I believe her criticisms are misplaced or in error. (3) Finally, I try to describe
general features of effective critique, in the sense of critical commentary that enables the advance of scientific
understanding through collective scholarly effort. Such criticism will be necessary if we are to sort out the
relative strengths and potential contributions of the several research traditions in human ecology (e.g., cultural
ecology, historical ecology, political ecology, etc.).
Introduction
Human behavioral ecology (HBE) is a subfield
of the social sciences in general and anthropology in
particular. It is a sibling approach to cultural, politi-
cal, historical, and other varieties of human ecology,
with which, like all good sets of siblings, it shares a
certain amount of likeness from disciplinary conti-
guity, habit and sympathy, as well as the occasional
episode of misunderstanding, fractiousness and criti-
cal, inter-sibling rivalry. In its broadest manifesta-
tion, HBE represents an attempt to understand di-
versity in human behavior on an inter- and intra-
societal basis as the product of common, species-wide
adaptive goals which must be realized in diverse,
socio-environmental circumstances. It employs eth-
nographic methods, particularly participant obser-
vation with local populations, although it brings to
field work a more quantitative emphasis than found
generally in anthropology. For theory and concepts,
HBE draws selectively from neo-Darwinism and its
cultural-evolutionary analogs, from micro-econom-
ics, and from elements of formal decision and game
theory. Thus, the approach adopts aspects of meth-
odological individualism and reductionism, drawing
on such premises as rationality, optimization, and
evolutionarily stable strategies, along with analytical
concepts such as marginal value and opportunity
costs. Scholars adopting this approach generally are
committed to the use of simple, formal models as
heuristic devices for generating testable hypotheses
from the more general propositions found in theory.
HBE comprises several closely related strands
of research. The more ecological track began in the
mid-1970s, when a small group of anthropology
graduate students and faculty began adapting opti-
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mal foraging theory models for the study of hunter-
gatherer ecology (Winterhalder and Smith 1981). A
second track developed through the application of
evolutionary biology models to the analysis of hu-
man reproductive and social behavior (Chagnon and
Irons 1979, Low 2000). These two strands, and a
third, that of dual inheritance or cultural evolution-
ary models (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Durham
1990) began more-or-less independently, are yet in-
completely merged (Smith 2000) and sometimes are
reciprocally critical of one another and of the related
studies that comprise the field of evolutionary psy-
chology (Smith et al. 2001).
The more ecological literature of HBE, on which
I shall focus, was developed as an alternative to the
cybernetic, ecosystem and energy-flow schools of eco-
logical anthropology dominant in the 1970s
(Richerson 1977, Smith 1984). From this base, HBE
has since expanded to encompass questions of resource
distribution, life history characteristics, social hierar-
chy, the origins of agriculture, and multiple other topics
(Winterhalder and Smith 2000). The methods em-
ployed have likewise proliferated, and now include
game theory (Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999),
risk-sensitive techniques (Winterhalder et al. 1999),
dynamic programming (Luttbeg et al. 2000, Mace
1996), and field assessment of utility (Kuznar 2000),
among others. HBE field research no longer is con-
fined to hunter-gatherer populations, but includes case
studies undertaken with pastoralists (e.g., Mace 1993),
horticulturalists (e.g., Hames 2000), fishers and har-
vesters of sea turtles (e.g., Bird and Bliege Bird 1997,
Sosis 2000), agriculturalists (e.g., Voland 1998) and
wage workers (e.g., Lancaster and Kaplan 2000). Ar-
chaeologists are among those making important con-
tributions (Bettinger et al. 1997, Broughton and
O’Connell 1999, Grayson 1998, Madsen and Schmitt
1998), HBE has ventured creatively into the interpre-
tation of hominid (O’Connell et al. 1999, Kaplan et
al. 2000) and agricultural (Piperno and Pearsall 1998)
origins, and there is a long-standing feminist strain
set within the field (review in Liesen 1998, see also
Hrdy 1999).
Ecological researchers in HBE generally consider
themselves to be advancing a project much like that
envisioned by Steward (1955), though informed by
contemporary evolutionary ecology theory and more
rigorous in its formalization of hypotheses and field
methodologies (Turner et al. 1997:34, Winterhalder
and Smith 1992:20-21). The reader interested in HBE
generally is recommended to Smith and Winterhalder
(1992, Winterhalder and Smith 2000). For the
compendia representing the broader field of evolu-
tionary social science in anthropology, see Weingart
et al. (1997), a recent collection of case studies (Cronk
et al. 2000) and an edited collection of classic papers,
with critical commentaries by outsiders and the origi-
nal authors (Betzig, 1997).
Joseph’s Critique of HBE
This description of HBE will be sufficient for
the reader to appreciate that it is something of an
anomaly in contemporary anthropology, which has
tended in recent years toward methodological col-
lectivism, qualitative analyses, and political, cultural
or interpretive emphases which sometimes take a
critical or even militantly hostile stance toward overtly
scientific, materialist and evolutionary or economic
studies of humans. Wide ranging critiques of HBE
have been published by social (Ingold 1996) and
ecological (Vayda 1995a, 1995b) anthropologists.
Among the more recent is an article by Joseph (2000),
the subject of this response, invited by the co-editor
of the Journal of Ecological Anthropology, David
Casagrande. I am an appropriate though not disin-
terested individual for this task since Joseph turns
frequently to my work in HBE to illustrate her points.
Joseph frames her critique of HBE, or what she
appropriately calls anthropological evolutionary ecol-
ogy (AEE), in terms of a “components of theory” (p.
7, Box 1) perspective, borrowed from the ecologists
Pickett, Kolasa and Jones (1994; hereafter PK&J).
While PK&J develop their ideas about “the nature of
theory and the theory of nature,”2 the subtitle of their
book, in order to promote integration and synthesis
among the many sub fields of bio-ecology, Joseph puts
2  To the extent that they deal with the philosophy of science, PK&J have the mainly emancipatory goal of freeing ecology from
lingering influences of positivism and understandings of theory based too strictly on history and practice in the physical
sciences. They are not as systematic about pursuing formulation of a coherent substitute, which would require that they sort
out and take a consistent position on various of the contemporary possibilities (Laudan 1990).
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their framework to the somewhat different task of criti-
cizing a particular sub-field of anthropology, HBE.
I follow her outline for the first part of this es-
say. I describe and comment on some of Joseph’s criti-
cisms (and note some shortcomings of HBE not
mentioned or emphasized by her). However, I have
a larger goal than that of identifying where I think
her observations about HBE are, or are not, apt. I
am more broadly interested in the uses and useful-
ness of criticism in scholarly writing, particularly in
a heterogeneous field like ecological anthropology.
In the second part of this paper I try to identify some
practices which I believe enhance or detract from
the scientific value of critique. What makes criticism
effective or ineffective—something quite apart from
what makes it usually satisfying to write and some-
times painful to read—is seldom if ever a subject of
explicit discussion in anthropology. Nonetheless, I
think we owe ourselves some attention to it. The
topics we address as human ecologists, the origins
and history, the structure and functioning, and the
sustainability of human-environment relations, along
with their capacity to support healthy and satisfying
lives across diverse societies, are of great practical and
humane significance. Improving the basic analytical
tools by which we advance understanding of these
topics is a responsibility we owe to scholarship as
well as to the people we study and about whom we
write. In this, good criticism is as important as good
research design and field methodologies.
Specifics of the Joseph Critique
(1) In her introduction, Joseph frames her criti-
cal evaluation of HBE in terms of a two-by-two ar-
ray of sixty cells determined by twelve components
(measuring degrees of theory completeness, and ex-
tending from “notions” to “translation modes”) and
five statuses (measuring degree of theory develop-
ment, from “pre-theoretic” to “confirmed or re-
jected”), adopted from PK&J.3 This scheme may be
a useful organizing device at a very general level, in
that it highlights the diverse elements of science.
However it is unnecessarily complex and unrealisti-
cally precise as an evaluative tool. I had little success,
for example, in trying to classify the parts of HBE I
know well enough to understand their flaws and guess
at their incompleteness. By contrast, in a recent re-
view of HBE, Winterhalder and Smith (2000) use a
much simpler scheme of six criteria derived from the
philosophers of science Kuhn (1977) and McMullin
(1983), hereafter, K&M. The K&M criteria are: pre-
dictive accuracy, internal coherence, external consis-
tency, fertility, unifying power and simplicity. Some
comparison in terms of these two schemes is instruc-
tive, and will illustrate problems of assessing a young
field like HBE at a very high level of generality like
that applied by Joseph.
According to Joseph, the PK&J scheme values
the addition and refinement of components and em-
pirical content. Thus greater complexity signals
progress. On this, HBE (AEE) gets low marks: “in
the case of AEE, more complex or highly derived
components have not yet accompanied simpler ones”
(p. 8). It is tricky to assess relative degrees of simplic-
ity and complexity. Nonetheless, I think Joseph is
mistaken about the failure of HBE to produce com-
plex or advanced components, and cite the list of
methodological developments given earlier as an ex-
ample. Perhaps the more interesting issue here is
which of the desiderata—simplicity or complexity—
we should value most as scientists.
I begin with appraisal of HBE in terms of its
simplicity or complexity, using several additional
examples. Joseph overlooks or under-values signifi-
cant HBE developments in part because her review
does not examine the history of the field. For in-
stance, early ecological use of HBE took the form
of optimal foraging theory models. Among other
elements, these models require that one specify a
currency by which the relative costs and benefits of
behavioral alternatives such as different selections
of resource options can be assessed. Applications
3  The full list of Joseph’s components is: notions, assumptions, definitions, concepts, facts, confirmed generalizations,
hypotheses, models, theorems, framework, domain and transaction modes. The full list of statuses: pre-theoretic,
intuitive, consolidating, empirical-interactive, and confirmed or rejected (Joseph 2000: 7, Figure 1). The like Figure
4.1 in PK&J (1994: 90) includes one component, “laws,” missing in Joseph; Joseph adds two components, “theo-
rems” and “domain,” not in PK&J, for reasons that are not explained.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol6/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.6.1.1
Winterhalder / Behavioral and Other Human Ecologies 7Vol. 6 2002
like those in Winterhalder and Smith (1981) typi-
cally used a very basic currency: the edible kilocalories
of energy that humans could derive from the resource.
Subsequent developments over the last two decades
have elaborated on this element by demonstrating the
importance of marginal evaluations of currency
(Winterhalder 1996), by incorporating additional
nutrients (Hill 1988), and by allowing for social dif-
ferentiation in the ways that individuals (e.g., males
and females; youth and adults) might value curren-
cies (Hawkes 1991; Hawkes et al. 1995, 1997). Each
of these has been a fruitful elaboration of a simple,
initial assumption. Likewise, early and purely deter-
ministic foraging models now have stochastic ver-
sions (review in Winterhalder et al. 1999); early non-
dynamic or state-independent mathematical tech-
niques are now matched by dynamic ones (Luttbeg
et al. 2000); and, graphical or algebraic model solu-
tions have been extended into simulation
(Winterhalder et al. 1988). Agent-based variants
(Kohler 2000) of basic optimal foraging theory (OFT)
models are a coming development. Further, as noted
in the introduction, the field has expanded into new
topic areas, and to analyses of non-foraging modes of
production (Winterhalder and Smith 2000). Similar
developments have taken place in parental investment
(e.g., Lancaster and Kaplan 2000) and life history (Hill
and Hurtado 1996, Hill and Kaplan 1999) studies.
In each of these instances, a simple element (e.g.,
currency, model, analytical framework, realm of ap-
plication) has been retained while more complex or
highly derived components are introduced by
stepwise refinement or elaboration of its possibili-
ties. Winterhalder (1986:370-371) has described this
process of beginning with basic elements and then—
as these are better understood—of cautiously add-
ing back complexity in terms of “simple models, pro-
gressively extended.”4 It is an imporant feature of the
history of HBE ignored in Joseph’s evaluation.
Though elaborations and increasing complex-
ity are clearly evident in the development of HBE, I
wish to stress the parallel intent to retain elements of
simplicity. HBE cannot be located at one point on a
simple-to-complex axis, nor has it moved
unidirectionally along such a continuum. I would
characterize its history as one of mosaic development,
seeking just enough complexity as is suited to a par-
ticular analysis or development and guarding sim-
plicity whenever it is possible to do so. I suspect that
most HBE researchers would cite Occam’s Razor and
agree with K&M that simplicity is a virtue in scien-
tific theories (see Boyer 1995). On this basis they
likely would evaluate their field more favorably than
does Joseph using the PK&J criterion.
In addition, Joseph criticizes HBE for what she
terms transfer problems: “Drawing on other theories
for components has also resulted in transfer problems,
where those components have acquired different mean-
ings and interpretations problematic in their new con-
text” (p. 8). Joseph develops no specific examples of
such problems, but it appears that she finds troubling
the analysis of anthropological materials using theory
that overlap with evolutionary biology and economics.
By contrast, the external consistency criterion of K&M
gives high marks to scientific theories that share key
elements with related theories in other fields. This al-
lows Winterhalder and Smith (2000) to evaluate HBE
favorably for the same feature that is troublesome to
Joseph: its willingness to seek interdisciplinary consis-
tency with neo-Darwinism, micro-economics and other,
relatively mature schools of theory. This kind of
interdisciplinarity of course is not new to or unusual
for anthropology, although these particular linkages
currently are out of favor with many anthropologists.
 (2) Domain offers another example in which
the evaluative criteria of the two frameworks, PK&J
and K&M, will lead us to divergent interpretations.
It is defined by Joseph as “the scope in space, time
and phenomena addressed by a theory” (p. 7). Low
marks again for HBE:
The domain is formulated early in theory
development, but is only fully articulated at later
stages of theory maturation (p. 8). . . Domains
4 An investigative procedure that recalls Vayda’s (1983) notion of “progressive contextualization,” though at a micro-founda-
tional scale of analysis and realized over the cumulative record of a research tradition.
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typically become more restricted as theory develops
because refinement shows that the theory is not
as grandly applicable as originally presumed (p.
10) . . . There is no attempt within AEE to
delineate the boundaries or domain of investigation
and specify that various predictions derived from
AEE models are only potentially useful for
understanding human behavior in highly
circumscribed circumstances or at very limited
levels of analysis (p. 10) . . . The failure to delimit
the domain of AEE creates confusion and debate
as to its applicability. (p. 12)
Several elements of this criticism are incorrect;
others invite disagreement with respect to their sig-
nificance as evaluative criteria.
First, it is simply wrong to claim that HBE
writers never acknowledge that the domain of their
approach is limited (“There is no attempt . . .”). Such
attempts are explicit and they are frequent in the HBE
literature. Here is an extended example, the second
paragraph of the introduction to Winterhalder
(1983:201-202, see also Winterhalder 1987:311-313
and Winterhalder 1986:370):
T[his] chapter has a narrow focus—the attempt
to understand systematically how a Cree makes
foraging decisions when harvesting food-
producing resources found within the boreal
forest. These resources are treated as valuable only
in that they provide calories. Nutrients and
nonconsumable products are, for the moment,
ignored. This goal has determined the topics
covered. Equally important, it excludes several
obvious and relevant subjects: the acquisition and
use of Euro-Canadian food stuffs, gardening, and,
except peripherally, the effects of the fur trade
on foraging decisions. This is a severe restriction,
but one with advantages. Foraging behavior is
complex. Hunting and gathering as ecological
processes are qualitatively and especially
quantitatively little understood; thus, rather
specific issues must be resolved before the more
inclusive ones can receive reliable analysis. I hope
to show that specific questions, systematically
studied, can generate fresh appreciation of the
more general issues that tend to engage
anthropologists, and build a base necessary for
expanded coverage.
Compare this to Joseph’s claim, “Thus, miss-
ing are well-developed qualifying statements that
various empirical findings derived from optimality
models only predict foraging behavior in highly con-
tingent circumstances or at very limited time scales
and at specific levels of socio-political organization
or complexity” (p. 18).
Attention to domain also is evident in the care-
ful placing of HBE relative to the broader roster of
questions that can be asked in evolutionary analyses
(Winterhalder and Smith 1992:9-11). It is unmis-
takable in the detailed acknowledgement of the dif-
ficult analytical trade-offs that accompany using
simple models (Winterhalder and Smith 1992:12-
14). It is apparent in care given to describing proper
and improper forms of reductionism (Winterhalder
and Smith 1992:14-16). It should be evident in will-
ingness to follow a social theorist like Elster (1982,
1983, 1985) on key issues related to methodological
individualism and collectivism, types of social sci-
ence explanation, and rationality (Smith and
Winterhalder 1992:38-50).
Most anthropologists using HBE have been
reluctant to make early, programmatic pronounce-
ments on the topical boundaries of the field, especially
grand ones. To take a personal example, I started HBE
research focused on analyzing the resource and patch
selection decisions of hunter-gatherers (Winterhalder
1977), a quite limited domain. I did not imagine
that twenty-five years later software engineers would
be citing and experimentally extending foraging
theory models to analyze how postmodern
“informavores” use the internet (Pirolli and Card
1999) or that library scientists would be using them
to better understand and help their information-for-
aging patrons (Sandstrom 1994). Likewise, when I
began trying to incorporate risk (stochasticity) into
resource selection models (Winterhalder 1986), I had
no prescience that a decade later a colleague and I
would find an application of the models to human
fertility decisions that may be relevant to the expla-
nation of demographic transitions, agricultural in-
tensification, and socio-cultural variation in fertility
(Leslie and Winterhalder 2001).
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Although it would have been imposible to pre-
dict such an outcome, HBE models, methods and
topical applications generally have proliferated cre-
atively and often successfully for 25 years. HBE con-
tinues to surprise its practitioners in positive ways,
giving no signs yet of exhausting its creative impulse
as a research tradition. For the most part, those in
the field have followed a tactic opposite that described
in Joseph and the PK&J framework, one of begin-
ning modestly and expanding their domain as expe-
rience warrants. Ecological anthropologists in HBE
have not generally made early, pre-emptive or ex-
pansive claims for topical domain, but have followed
ideas where they seemed to lead, letting the domain
grow with the promise of insights and the success of
applications.5 This is untidy and perhaps confusing,
but it is more honest and pragmatic than augury.
If predicting domain is impractical, it also may
be philosophically suspect. K&M argue that the
progress of a science can be evaluated positively if its
domain grows in ways not foreseen by its initiators.
Here again, a phenomenon that the PK&J frame-
work might depreciate is cast favorably by the K&M
criteria for scientific progress.6
We have then, three instances of divergent ap-
praisal, depending on which of two general evalua-
tive frameworks is employed. I happen to believe
the approach taken by K&M represents a superior
historical and philosophical understanding of sci-
entific progress (e.g., Laudan 1977). It is also a more
practical approach to assessing it than the scheme
of PK&J.
If the element of evaluative indeterminacy here
is cause for dismay, we might have better results
and more agreement with K&M’s category of pre-
dictive accuracy, which I take to be similar to
PK&J’s highest developmental statuses: “empirical-
interactive” and “confirmed or rejected.” Here
Winterhalder and Smith (2000:65-66) are them-
selves critical of their field: “. . . the number of com-
pelling, data-rich HBE studies is still quite small . . .
On this most important of desiderata—superior
agreement with observation—the HBE record is
positive but altogether too thin.” Joseph may agree
with this, although my remedy—more HBE em-
pirical studies of ever better methodology—may not
be hers.
(3) Basic Concepts: In this section Joseph de-
scribes “four general features” (p. 13) of HBE, co-
gently for the most part. Because the points she makes
also are widely summarized in the general HBE lit-
erature, I will not repeat them. I do wish to call at-
tention to four areas in which I believe her charac-
terization to be inaccurate, misleading or incomplete.
(a) First, HBE does not apply natural selec-
tion theory at the macro-evolutionary scale (p. 13).
Rather it focuses on the evolutionary micro-scale
almost exclusively. It is either agnostic or quite ten-
tative about its potential for contributing to the ex-
planation of community- or ecosystem-level phe-
nomena, or phenomena that are evident over long
(macro-evolutionary) time scales, such as phyloge-
netic patterns of speciation (Winterhalder and
Smith 1992:22, Kacelnik and Krebs 1997:27).
Based on the success of neo-Darwinism and the
absence of viable theoretical alternatives of compa-
rable scope, we have good reasons to think that neo-
Darwinism eventually will provide the necessary
micro-foundations for understanding natural pro-
cesses at all scales. But, whether or to what degree
micro-evolutionary processes will be sufficient to
characterize the emergent properties of communi-
ties, ecosystems and long-term phylogenies is at
present an open question. Given this self-imposed
caution, Joseph’s discussion of punctuated equilib-
ria, Milankovitch cycles, co-evolution and the Red
Queen Hypothesis as challenges to behavioral
ecology’s domain (p. 10-12) have no purchase.
5 I personally find this more appealing than an approach like that of cybernetic/homeostatic ecosystem theory (e.g., Odum
1969), which began with undue certainty and expansive statements and then went through the lengthy ordeal of a messy
retreat from its claims. False confidence about domain (e.g., sociobiology’s early claim that it would subsume the social
sciences, anthropology’s repeated claim that rationality theory applies only to capitalist societies; relativism’s claim to
trump all other philosophies of science) is a scourge in our field.
6 Although PK&J do state: “A question that causes a theory to encompass some phenomenon well outside its accepted
domain is fundamental” [to increasing the scope of a theory] (PK&J 1994: 119).
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There are good examples of the ways in which
behavioral ecology research can play this micro-
foundational role. One is Sutherland’s (1996)
monograph-length exploration of the ways in which
a very simple behavioral ecology model (the ideal
free distribution) can inform issues of population
distribution and ecology. Others are found in the
volume on behavioral ecology and conservation
biology edited by Caro (1998).
(b) Second, the manner in which method-
ological individualism (MI) actually is employed
by HBE is more limited than the statement made
by Joseph (p. 13). It is a research tactic, not a claim
about social reality (Smith and Winterhalder
1992), a perspective not so different from schools
of socio-cultural anthropology placing emphasis
on actor-based approaches and human agency. MI
is “the doctrine that all social phenomena—their
structure and their change—are in principle ex-
plicable in ways that only involve individuals—
their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their
actions” (Elster 1985:5). This strict definition en-
tails some supra-individual elements, as the prop-
erties, goals, beliefs and actions of individuals are
social and not themselves solely individual phe-
nomena. Elster cites further qualifications (e.g.,
Elster 1985:5-8, 359) and HBE statements echo
his caution. Thus, “[t]he primary goal of MI
[methodological individualism] is to provide
‘microfoundations’ or ‘actor-based accounts’ for
social phenomena by analyzing the extent to which
they are the aggregate outcomes of individual be-
liefs, preferences, and actions” (Smith and
Winterhalder 1992:39). Note the open-ended
phrase, “the extent to which.” This statement does
not say, “by showing that they are entirely the ag-
gregate outcome of individual . . .” Likewise, “The
general point, for either [the] MI social scientist
or evolutionary ecologist, is that explanation of
social phenomena, including group-level benefits,
should pay attention to individual-level mecha-
nisms” (Smith and Winterhalder 1992:41). Again,
note the qualified status of this claim. It says
“should pay attention to,” not “need only pay at-
tention to,” individual-level mechanisms. This
parsing of quotations would be unnecessary ex-
cept that mention of MI and certain other con-
ceptual elements of HBE (optimization, rational-
ity, etc.) appears to blind anthropologists to quali-
fying phrases set around them.7
(c) Third, HBE does assume differential fit-
ness (reproductive success) among the members of
a population, thus a key neo-Darwinian compo-
nent of natural selection, but this is not the same
as assuming “high reproductive success and stabil-
ity” (p. 14, see Smith and Winterhalder 1992:50-
53). Differential reproductive success can occur
whether fertility is high or low, and irrespective of
its stability over time.
(d) Finally, Gould and Lewontin (1979) are
cited favorably by Joseph for their high profile cri-
tique of the “adaptationist program,” of which
HBE is a part. The reader will get a more balanced
perspective on the adaptation debate in biology by
also consulting rebuttals of that paper (e.g.,
Maynard Smith 1978, Mayr 1983), along with the
sociology of science and rhetorical analyses of it
found in Selzer (1993).
(4) Empirical Content. In this section Joseph
briefly describes some instances of foraging and life
history analyses. She criticizes them not so much for
what they do but for what she believes that they omit.
Her general claims are two-fold: first, the empirical
analyses and case studies generated by optimality
models “have a much narrower meaning and signifi-
cance than recognized within AEE” (p. 14). This is a
question of domain, and a reasonable position only
if the often repeated cautionary statements in the
HBE literature are ignored (see above). Second, Jo-
seph appears to wish that every analysis be compre-
hensively holistic and encompass multiple scales:
Even simple outcomes may be due to very
complex processes and these processes involve
more than just simple individuals acting to
maximize economic or reproductive returns.
7  Incidentally, this tactical focus on individuals has its counterpart in bio-ecology: “It is quite significant that all the traditional
ecological hierarchies intersect at least at the level of individual organism, suggesting that this node may be the place to begin to
explore commonality and integration in ecology” (PK&J 1994: 21; italics added).
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Rather, such historical processes involve the
presence of complex state structures, sociopolitical
relationships, and cultural and ideological processes
of negotiation. At the very least, empirical findings
should clarify (or involve reference to) pattern,
process, cause and mechanism. . . and locate
individual behavior[s] in their complex multiple
environments, which include physical, biological,
social and cultural at a minimum. . . . (pp. 15-16)
The ontological claim here (“Even simple out-
comes may be due . . .”) I assume to be true in its
contingent form.8 The methodological claim (“At the
very least . . .), however, is not acceptable. There cer-
tainly is a place in ecological anthropology for com-
prehensive, multi-scale analyses; in fact, there are
instances of this approach in HBE. Hrdy’s (1999)
study of mothering is a marvelous example. But,
broad-stroke holism isn’t the only analytical option,
nor always an effective place to begin. Undertaken
prematurely, it can impede understanding or pro-
duce superficial results (e.g., Elster 1985 on Marx’s
group-level functionalism). For this reason, HBE is
explicit about the importance of isolating and pur-
suing more limited analyses:
Foraging behavior variability is complex and
multicausal, but unless we can predict the effects of
its causes taken separately, we have no hope of
disentangling their respective effects when taken
together. (Winterhalder 1986:371)
And, as befits this approach, HBE also is clear
about acknowledging the need eventually to move
beyond a focus on the particulars:
Explicitly reductionist in its methods, as HBE
matures it will have to demonstrate that it can
successfully reintegrate topically isolated models into
a compelling and more holistic understanding of
human adaptive behavior. (Winterhalder and Smith
2000:67)
Many of Joseph’s examples are interesting for
features that she overlooks or for the way in which
her criticisms miss their mark. For instance, the work
of archaeologist Jack Broughton (1994a, 1994b,
1997)9 is an especially compelling example of HBE
analysis because he makes an active effort to exclude
alternative explanations (e.g., climate change) of
empirical observations he believes to be consistent
with foraging theory hypotheses. Joseph claims that
Broughton neglects environmental and historical
context, but in fact, they are the very heart of his
work on resource intensification in the late prehis-
tory of California. Similarly, Joseph describes10 my
extensions of basic foraging models into analyses of
the population dynamics of foragers and their re-
sources (Winterhalder et al. 1988), and to social
questions of resource distribution within groups (e.g.,
sharing, Winterhalder 1986), as if they vitiated simple
foraging models. In fact, these papers are refinements
and extensions of basic foraging models that, to the
extent they are successful, validate what K&M cri-
teria would term the empirical fruitfulness of for-
aging theory.
Joseph summarizes the debate surrounding
Blurton Jones’ (1986, 1987) birth interval model for
the !Kung San in terms that make it appear to have
been a largely futile exercise: “Thus, we are still left
with a case of one, with several methodological short-
comings” (p. 19). Blurton Jones’ own candid retro-
spective (Blurton Jones 1997:83) on the research and
discussion his analysis provoked is no less critical,
but it does conclude with a less pessimistic and more
realistic appreciation of the way in which science
progresses: “In science we often learn more when
things don’t work out the way we expected.” By
choosing three examples of refuted hypotheses from
Hill and Hurtado’s (1996) monograph on Ache ecol-
ogy and demography, Joseph is able to conclude that
life history theory has “contributed few if any inter-
esting insights” (p. 19). Smith’s (1996) review essay,
8 “The qualities of [human] behavior impose special demands on its analysis. Individual behavior and social life are complex and
diverse, ephemeral in their observable manifestations, and subject to rapid change over time. They are shaped by several
different kinds of causes ranging from genes to symbols” (Winterhalder and Smith 1992: 4).
9  Joseph’s account relies on a summary found in Boone and Smith (1998).
10 Joseph relies on summaries found in Bettinger (1991), replicating Bettinger’s mistaken citation of Winterhalder et al. (1988)
with a date of 1989.
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by contrast, describes confirmed hypotheses, and
catalogs the work’s many contributions to ethnogra-
phy, methodology (e.g., in assessing small popula-
tion age structure) and theory. Analyses by Wilson
and Daly (1997) refute Joseph’s claim (p. 19) that
life history theory is of interest only to inter-specific
or higher taxonomic comparisons.
Throughout her review Joseph tallies falsified
hypotheses as if they were coffin nails for the HBE
effort. However, behavioral ecologists celebrate hav-
ing a framework that takes hypothesis testing seri-
ously. They strive to make their methods sufficiently
rigorous that it is possible to regularly identify the
flaws in their predictions. They have well-developed
procedures for advancing understanding when hy-
potheses fail (Kacelnik and Krebs 1997:24,32;
Winterhalder n.d.), an approach similar to that of
ecology generally: “Incorrect theories or components
of theory can have great heuristic value . . .” (PK&J
1994:118). This willingness to state hypotheses in
terms that put them at risk of falsification is rare in
ecological anthropology.
 (5) Two important issues are raised in Joseph’s
section on derived conceptual devices. They affect
not just HBE, but a broader range of schools in the
social sciences. Joseph makes these charges: first, its
methodology commits HBE to assuming what it is
trying to demonstrate—that organisms are
adapted—and second, this error is compounded by
assuming, not demonstrating, that these adaptations
achieve a state of optimality. Neither charge will sur-
vive a careful reading of the HBE literature.
The first of these related concerns evokes the
issue of functionalism. Joseph repeats Vayda’s (1995a,
1995b) criticism that HBE is an instance of naïve
functionalism, or in her words “hyperfunctionalist
post hoc accommodative reasoning” (p. 24). She,
however, does not give examples. The charge of
naïveté neglects the careful methodological attention
given to the issue of functionalism by advocates of
HBE (Winterhalder and Smith 1992:6-7, Smith and
Winterhalder 1992:42-45), who generally have fol-
lowed Elster (1982) on this point. Key elements of
the methodology adopted by HBE have the role of
minimizing the analytical problems associated with
functionalism and the analysis of adaptation. They
include the requirement that models of ecological
circumstances be matched by those of evolutionary
mechanism (Winterhalder 1997); the focus on se-
lective mechanisms and micro-foundations; the MI
focus on agents which (who) actually have adaptive
agency; an insistence on clearly specified hypothesis
testing; etc. If HBE were simply a matter of
hyperfunctionalist, posthoc accommodative reason-
ing, it would not have a record of occasionally falsi-
fying one or another of its hypotheses.
In his analysis of explanation in the social sci-
ences Elster (1983:25-95) argues that neo-Darwin-
ism is the only comprehensive theory presently ca-
pable of providing a logical justification for explana-
tion by beneficial consequences. This may be true,
but it is more important to HBE that neo-Darwin-
ism provides quite specific guidelines and constraints
within which such analyses can be framed (Smith
and Winterhalder 1992). The temptations of func-
tionalism, the degree to which the social sciences
wittingly and unwittingly practice functionalism in
its several forms, and the possible harmfulness of that,
are worthy of lament (Turner and Maryanski 1979).
The theoretical safeguards sought by HBE advocates
should be cause for study and analysis, and where
possible improvement, but that kind of effort is not
found here. If Joseph has means of helping us or her
fellow social scientists understand better than we do
the issues of functionalism or adaptationism, it would
be more productive for her to share those insights
than to repeat epithets like “naïve.”
Do advocates of HBE assume optimal adap-
tations or states in nature? No, although this is a
common misunderstanding. Optimization is a theo-
retical premise justified by the directional tendency
of selective processes; it provides a framework for
generating testable predictions. It is thus quite dif-
ferent from the claim that some or another phe-
nomena in nature ever or regularly achieve a state
of optimality, and in fact, analyses based on the
premise are necessary to determine the degree to
which evolutionary outcomes may fall short of
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optimality. Maynard Smith and Parker are the of-
ten-cited, foundational papers on optimization: “The
essential point is that in testing a model we are not
testing the general proposition that nature optimizes,
but the specific hypotheses about constraints, opti-
mization criteria, and heredity” (Maynard Smith
1978:35, italics in original). Or, “Optimization mod-
els help us to test our insight into the biological con-
straints that influence the outcome of evolution. They
serve to improve our understanding about adapta-
tions, rather than to demonstrate that natural selec-
tion produces optimal solutions” (Parker and
Maynard Smith 1990:27).11 These same points are
regularly stated in HBE publications (e.g., Smith and
Winterhalder 1992:50-53, Winterhalder 1987:313-
314, see also Foley 1985).
(6) Inadequacies of theory/framework—the
general critiques of this section are two-fold: HBE
adopts an evolution-supplanted-by-history view of
human development (p. 21-22) and it’s theory of
environment is deficient (p. 22-24) to the point of
being “absurd” (p. 23).
The first of these critiques prompts Joseph to
pose (I presume to HBE) the rhetorical question:
“when does evolutionary time and natural selection-
driven change end and history and phenotypic ad-
aptation, driven by “decision-making,” begin? Does
evolutionary time end with Homo sapiens sapiens,
with the rise of culture during the Upper Paleolithic,
or with the rise of agriculture or the rise of the state?”
(p. 21). Because the idea that there is a Rubicon
between evolution-without-culture and culture
without-evolution hasn’t been viable since Alfred
Russell Wallace (1871), I suspect Joseph alludes here
to the rather complex issue of dual inheritance
(Boyd and Richerson 1985, Durham 1990) and the
evolution of open behavioral programs (Mayr
1974). However, her rationale for representing it
as a chronological matter of sequential causation
rather than an analytical matter of interacting cau-
sation is a puzzle. Joseph apparently is unaware that
there are HBE discussions of conceptual and other
relationships between history and evolution (e.g.,
Boyd and Richerson 1992, Winterhalder 1994,
Boone and Smith 1998).
On her second point, Joseph objects first to
distinguishing behavior from the environment in
which it occurs, and secondly to the practice in
HBE of attending selectively only to certain ele-
ments of the environment. With respect to separa-
tion: “If the human social sciences have contrib-
uted anything to our understanding of human be-
havior over the last several hundred years, it is that
human behavior is never context free and without
structure” (p. 22). This is of course true. But as a
truism, it also provides us no analytical guidance
for analyzing behavior in context. We can acknowl-
edge that in many cases behavior and context are
reciprocally causal (as in the evolutionary and eco-
nomic concept of a strategic environment; see
Elster 1986:7), but this does not mean that we are
logically precluded from distinguishing them for
analytical purposes.
A clue as to why Joseph would think the pre-
viously quoted truism is damaging to HBE may
reside in her second criticism. “In AEE, when the
environment is alluded to, it is so artificially re-
stricted as to be useless . . . Analyzing individual
foraging behavior or any other behavior without
embedding them in broader social, cultural, and
biophysical contexts (graphically depicted in Fig-
ure 3) is absurd” (p. 23). Joseph appears to be ob-
jecting to delimiting a subset of variables from
among the possible ones in order to pursue a fo-
cused analysis. As a general proposition, her point
is a weak one. This kind of restriction is more-or-
less synonymous with identifying a problem; most
social science analyses extract from the array of many
possibilities a subset to investigate. If, like HBE,
they have a suitable framework for constructing and
11 Optimization is assumed in HBE in the same special and limited way that most research traditions make high level assump-
tions not themselves directly subject to verification. For instance, “research traditions are neither explanatory, nor predictive, nor
directly testable” (Laudan 1977: 81-82, italics in original) though their constituent theories are.
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testing hypotheses, and for interpreting the results,
it will become apparent if the selected restrictions
rob the analysis of any ability to contribute to un-
derstanding.12
(7) Conclusion: Joseph ends her essay with this
statement: “. . . what I am calling for is a new evo-
lutionary ecology, one that goes beyond the apolo-
getic capitalist world-view of biology” (p. 24). In
as much as there is no explicit discussion in Joseph’s
essay of apologism, capitalism or the world-view of
biology, it is difficult to read this statement except
as a kind of code, one that calls up ideological dis-
approval based on undocumented allegations about
the politics of a field and those who practice it. It
accuses, but offers no content to which there can
be a response.
Critique as Practice
We ought to encourage and prize critique, pro-
mote it as a craft and eagerly seek out instances that
touch on our preferred academic haunts.13 Most of
us, I would guess, probably do not see criticism so
favorably or expose ourselves to it so avidly. Surely
in part this is because it can be hard on our egos. But
I think it also is because facile or bad critique is far
too common and perhaps even the norm in anthro-
pology.14 This situation prompts me to try to de-
scribe what I believe are the features of scientifically
effective critique. By effective I mean something be-
yond rhetorical power—capacity to sway opinion or
confirm prejudices—though that always is an ele-
ment in writing. I mean effective in the sense of ca-
pacity to advance understanding through collective
effort, effort that engages diverse experiences and
viewpoints, kinds of knowledge, and skills in a dia-
log that encourages scientific progress. If my prelimi-
nary set of such features stimulates broader atten-
tion to this subject, it will serve its purpose.
I focus on the situation of criticism between
differing scientific schools of thought, paradigms
(Kuhn 1962), or the term I think best suits different
fields in human ecology, “research traditions”
(Laudan 1977:70-120). Nonetheless, some of my
points bear on other forms of critique, such as short
commentaries and book reviews. I will not rehash
the more obviously objectionable critical techniques
such as ad hominem attacks, or blatantly political or
rhetorical exercises. These generally signal themselves
in their choice of language.
(1) Effective critique has a well-defined and
openly acknowledged perspective. In effect, it pro-
ceeds from a framework that is explicitly stated
and that offers a platform for evaluation. If a re-
view is framed in terms of philosophical questions,
then it will be more effective if the author has a
consistent, identified philosophical perspective. If
a review is framed as a critique of a research tradi-
tion, then the author’s research tradition alle-
giances should be stated. This need not be an oner-
ous requirement, bane of page limitations, but it
is an essential one.
On this feature, for instance, Joseph’s critique
of HBE gets a mixed review: the PK&J framework
is a plus, but is not matched by willingness to adopt
an explicitly stated alternative research tradition in
human ecology.15
12 Incidentally, the biologists Kacelnik and Krebs are badly misrepresented. Here is Joseph (p. 23-24): “given the position of some
practitioners that “I personally find ‘culture’ unnecessary” (Betzig 1997: 17) or that “the latter [culture] is very accommodat-
ing: it does not get in the way of fitness maximization” (Kacelnik and Krebs 1997: 28), then there may be no attempt in the
near future to seriously consider the role of culture.” This comment makes it appear as if Kacelnik and Krebs (1997) are
echoing Betzig’s dismissal of culture. However, a careful reading of the text will show that in the extract quoted here they are
making a charitable restatement of Betzig in order to disagree with her. They are not subtle about their own views; the boldface
heading which appears just several lines above the section Joseph quotes is: “We, personally, find culture necessary” (1997: 27).
13 The volume edited by Betzig (1997) is an interesting experiment in self-criticism.
14 This is not an oblique comment on Joseph’s review of HBE. I already have identified specific points on which we disagree about
HBE; I should add that her critique avoids many of the pitfalls I think most compromise anthropological commentaries in
general.
15 “. . .the purpose of this paper is not to develop an alternative framework for the study of human ecology and evolution . . .” (p.
8; cf. Figure 2).
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(2) Effective critique is motivated by construc-
tive objectives, explicitly revealed. An author’s ob-
jectives in writing a critique are multiple, rarely
stated, not always obvious, and not, I believe, of
equal merit. Among other motivations, they include
one or more of the wishes to: (a) inform a broad
audience about an approach by establishing its cur-
rent content and reach; (b) advance meta-under-
standing of a broad area of inquiry by placing an
approach relative to others; (c) use the approach as
a ‘foil’ to examine comparatively an alternative re-
search tradition that shares one or more features;
(d) instruct practitioners about shortcomings or
unrealized possibilities and thus improve their prac-
tice; (e) dissuade a broader audience from attend-
ing to or pursuing work with a particular litera-
ture; (f ) promote an alternative agenda; or, (g) con-
firm shared though unexamined preconceptions
about an approach or its results. I would classify
motivations “a” through “d” as more, and “e”
through “g” as less, constructive.
(3) Effective critique begins by engaging the
subject work on its own terms. This means taking
seriously what the author is trying to accomplish.
An essential and commonly neglected element of cri-
tique is the question: What are the author’s self-iden-
tified objectives, and how well does the work suc-
ceed by them? Writing criticism by this admonition
helps to insure that the reviewer strives for some in-
ternal understanding of the work before setting about
identifying its errors or limitations.16 This does not
mean that criticism has to ignore whatever alterna-
tive terms or views the critic feels are worthwhile (see
#1). It certainly is fair to complain about incom-
plete or inadequate treatment of the author’s chosen
topic. Shortcomings deserve exposure; unrecognized
opportunities should be illuminated. But good cri-
tique, even devastatingly good critique, begins with
a charitable and a careful reading.
(4) Effective critique represents accurately the
practice of a field, no more or less. This sounds un-
exceptional, but much criticism eases its task by mis-
representing, overstating or exaggerating what is
claimed by advocates on behalf of a field. Critics
sometimes presume features that are not overt; im-
pute goals or accomplishments that are not stated.
This is usually done indirectly. Joseph provides sev-
eral examples: “Thus, there is a need for AEE to
bound the scope and scale of theoretical investiga-
tion. After all, no single theory can account for the
entire range of variation and change in human socio-
cultural behaviors, structures, interactions, and flows
across time and space” (p. 12). Or, “The important
point is this: human behavioral outcomes (in this
example foraging behaviors) are rarely if ever due to
any fixed predetermined or innate characteristic of
our species’ decision making, but rather [are] con-
tingent upon particular historical epochs and social
structures . . .” (p. 15). There would be no need to
say these things, except to imply—incorrectly—that
HBE strives to be that single theory, or that it as-
sumes human behavior is unaffected by historical
epoch or social structure.
(5) Effective critique is based on first-hand fa-
miliarity with the history and substance of the work
or field being reviewed. The converse is criticism
of a field by citing isolated instances of exaggera-
tions, dogmatisms or errors of logic and fact. Even
solid, well defined and responsible fields of inquiry
house individuals with a wide range of styles and
proclivities to make bold, sometimes unguarded
declarations. Every field has its strong and its weak
applications. Most of us who have been writing for
any length of time, and especially the more creative
among us, can look back with a twinge of embar-
rassment at one or more incautious statements,
however analytically conservative we may be other-
wise. It is a relatively easy task to gather together
and then condemn an intrinsically damning col-
lection of these squibs, but they may tell us almost
nothing about the substance of a field, the way in
which it has developed, or its potential to add to
understanding. Creationists do this to evolution-
ists to great rhetorical effect, but I am surprised and
occasionally bewildered at how often scholars do it
to their colleagues. Who can resist clobbering the
16 Formally this corresponds to the method of rational reconstruction: “The striking feature of the method of rational reconstruc-
tion is the logical separation of the question of understanding a theory from the question of agreeing with it” (Wong 1978: 10).
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easily scorned phrase, in place of a more demand-
ing description and assessment of content and its
history? Mature critique relies on knowing the his-
tory and primary literature of a field with sufficient
thoroughness to winnow the careless remarks from
the substance.
I would also include under this heading the
benefits of avoiding critique by ‘proxy.’ I refer here
to the practice of citing the summary statements
(or epithets) of other reviewers, without the ration-
ales. Effective critique engages primary sources. It
does not rely on secondary accounts, either for criti-
cal points or for secondary summaries of content.
Likewise, a more subtle form of this guideline
would enjoin a critique to apprise how a concept
or other element of theory or practice is applied in
a field, quite apart from preconceptions about its
suitability.
Another common violation of this feature of
effective critique is criticism by the possibility of er-
ror, instead of a demonstration that the error actu-
ally occurs in practice with sufficient frequency or
analytical importance to compromise a field of in-
quiry. Joseph provides an example: “The fundamen-
tal problem with proceeding from initial assump-
tions about the general consequences of evolution-
ary processes is that there is nothing to guard against
subverting the empirical investigation of processes
and mechanisms to suit that assumption” (p. 14).
In general form, this statement is true of any re-
search tradition. Given that possible mistakes are
nearly infinite in variety, it would seem much more
productive to focus on those that are, in fact, com-
monly made.
 (6) Effective critique diagnoses problems in a
manner that reveals their relative importance. Ide-
ally it would also evaluate, at least in tentative terms,
the hope for and likely manner of their resolution.
This would contrast with critique that appears de-
signed to smother its subject by enumerating a long
and undifferentiated litany of flaws, without a sys-
tematic attempt to assess their significance. In ef-
fect, good criticism informs the reader what is blem-
ish, what is a serious problem that might be recti-
fied, and what may be a mortal defect. It would
also indicate what are unsolved problems—com-
mon in any relatively new research tradition, offer-
ing opportunities for its further development—and
what the author projects to be unsolvable problems.
A related issue is that of presenting internal
debates among advocates seeking to improve a field
as if they were seeking instead to critically dismiss
it. For instance, someone unfamiliar with HBE
would not know from reading Joseph that Mayr,
Maynard Smith, and Bettinger are friendly critics
and advocates, working to improve an approach
they find promising. Vayda and Ingold, on the other
hand, seek to convince the reader that key elements
of HBE are hopelessly defective.
I think it fair to say that proponents of HBE
are aware of most or all of the shortcomings men-
tioned by Joseph. For instance, “. . . most HBE
work to date has neglected proximate analysis of
the mechanisms guiding the adaptive behavior of
individuals, be these rules of thumb, evolved psy-
chological dispositions, or sociocultural inheritance.
Likewise, it has neglected the actual histories by
which such traits develop in populations”
(Winterhalder and Smith 2000:67). But what she
sees as failures—a word that implies unsuccessful
attempts to solve—we would see as problems and
issues awaiting the effort that may (or if one pre-
fers to be more optimistic, likely will) lead either to
their resolution or, if not that, to a better under-
standing of domain.
(7) Effective criticism is narrowly comparative.
By this I mean that it puts one research tradition or
theory up against another on topics or problems
they have in common and makes a relative evalua-
tion in terms of explicit criteria.17 Much criticism
does not offer and defend a more viable alternative
(theory, concept, method) for whatever is identi-
fied as the shortcoming of the work under review.
If it is not comparative, criticism can be remedial
17 “. . . the evaluation of theories is a comparative matter. What is crucial in any cognitive assessment of a theory is how it fares
with respect to its competitors. Absolute measures of the empirical or conceptual credentials of a theory are of no signifi-
cance; decisive is the judgment as to how a theory stacks up against its known contenders” (Laudan 1977: 71, italics in
original).
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but not dismissive; that is, it can identify areas where
development is needed, and it may suggest ways to
improve the research tradition under review, but it
can not offer evidence that the tradition should be
depreciated in importance or abandoned in favor
of another. The astute reader will want to know, if
not this, then what? And, what assurances are there
that the alternative offered has better solutions to
these problems, or that it does not entail serious
problems of its own?18
In the case of HBE, this would suggest that
critics are obligated to show how alternative re-
search traditions do a better job of answering the
questions specific HBE applications are attempt-
ing to answer, according to criteria like those de-
vised by K&M. If conducted in a spirit consistent
with other guidelines being suggested here, that
would be an enlightening exercise, one I suspect
favorable to HBE.
(8) Effective criticism exercises itself on case
studies and empirical issues. This is not to say that
high level elements of the research endeavor such
as theory, concepts, research design, methods or in-
terpretive issues are off limits. But, critiques that
remain at a high level of generality or limit them-
selves to the realm of philosophical questions are
less likely to engage their audience in productive
ways. This may reflect the fractured state of the
contemporary history and philosophy of science and
the temptations of social scientists to overlay their
own contentiousness onto the shifting uncertain-
ties of that field. It may reflect the more general
point that empirical content anchors debate in ways
that more abstract elements do not. Exercising two
research traditions on one or more case studies of-
ten is the most revealing way of locating their rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses.
As an example, Kelly’s (1995) monographic-
length review of the literature on human foragers is
an excellent effort to integrate micro-level HBE ex-
planation with large (spatial) scale generalizations
about pattern in hunter-gatherer societies derived
mainly from studies undertaken within the cultural
ecology research tradition.
It is daunting to envision writing criticism ac-
cording to the cumulative strictures of such guide-
lines I have suggested. Nonetheless, any movement
in the directions they endorse will improve our col-
lective ability to advance understanding of human
ecology, especially through commentary on each
other’s research traditions.
Conclusions
Although Joseph does not identify herself with
a specific paradigm or research tradition, I think it
possible to offer, at least tentatively, some more gen-
eral comments on sources of difference between her
perspective and that of HBE.
Joseph wants holistic analyses that are com-
prehensive in the sense of simultaneously engaging
all of the possible physical, biological, social and
cultural variables, across all scales (e.g., her Figures
2-4). By contrast, followers of HBE generally be-
lieve it is both possible and important to work ‘by
pieces,’ that is, to study in detail parts of problems,
confident that the understanding obtained through
that procedure will eventually find a place in the
larger picture. I imagine Joseph and me picketing
each other’s research tradition with signs that read,
respectively: “Holism must be comprehensively
engaged from the beginning,” and “Holism is a
laudable goal but still a distant prospect.” We dis-
agree then on the variety of scales and number of
variables that constitute a worthy and manageable
research problem.
Joseph shares the general anthropological dis-
trust of theory derived from evolutionary biology
and economics, especially some of their conceptual
assumptions and their emphasis on mechanism and
micro-foundations. HBE, by contrast, sees these
fields as valuable sources of theory and analytical
tools, necessary but not necessarily sufficient for
18 Here is an instance of the comparative nature of theory evaluation, directly stated: “Neoclassical economics will be
dethroned if and when satisficing theory and psychology join forces to produce a simple and robust explanation of
aspiration levels, or sociological theory comes up with a simple and robust theory of the relation between social norms
and instrumental rationality. Until this happens, the continued dominance of neoclassical theory is ensured by the fact
that one can’t beat something with nothing” (Elster 1986: 26-27).
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pursuing understanding of human behavior. HBE
selectively adapts ideas from these sources because
they have greater safeguards against some recurrent
problems in the social sciences, such as group-level
functionalism; it recognizes the intrinsic merit of
practicing cross-disciplinary integration with fields
like biology and economics. While it is quite inter-
disciplinary in general, contemporary anthropol-
ogy generally is not approving of linkages that hap-
pen to go in this direction.
Finally, we disagree on how to assess progress
in a nascent scientific endeavor. HBE is a young
and, so far as the number of persons pursuing it, a
quite small research tradition with an impressive
record of accomplishment. There are areas of theo-
retical ambiguity (Have we escaped or only partially
evaded the ills of functionalism? How do models
of cultural inheritance affect the analysis of adapta-
tion?), and a long list of things yet to be done, any
of which might turn out to affect the endeavor in
ways we have yet to apprehend. Followers of HBE
are willing under some circumstances to count the
failure of theoretically substantial hypotheses as a
perfectly respectable way of advancing understand-
ing within a research tradition (Winterhalder n.d.);
Joseph tallies them as signals the tradition is defi-
cient. In these and other ways revealed in the com-
parison of PK&J and K&M we are applying diver-
gent evaluative criteria and for fairly obvious rea-
sons coming to divergent conclusions.
PK&J point out that integration of bio-eco-
logical paradigms would require that each be highly
developed, whereas some are “in a state of concep-
tual infancy” (p. 142). They add that “integration
across paradigms may be limited if theory in one of
the areas is poorly developed . . .” (p. 143), and “All
paradigms must be represented by clear, complete
theories before they can be integrated” (p. 147). I
conclude by asking the reader to contemplate the
comparable prospects for integrating, or at least for
understanding the respective strengths of the vari-
ous research traditions in human ecology. How well
are cultural ecology (Steward 1955), ecological an-
thropology (Vayda and McCay 1975), political ecol-
ogy (Greenberg and Park 1994), historical ecology
(Balée 1998) and other approaches equipped in this
regard? Despite its relatively brief history, HBE
would bring to such a ‘place-finding’ comparison a
more self-consciously delimited, formally developed
and rigorously tested theoretical framework than
most of its sibling traditions. But demonstrating
something like that would require that we collec-
tively have much greater experience with the kind
of comparative, effective critical evaluation that I
hope that this paper will promote.
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